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Abstract. We study the learning dynamics of agents who adapt to heterogeneous
comfort levels in the context of an El-Farol type game, and show that even an
infinitesimal degree of heterogeneity in the resource levels leads to a significant
reduction of the fluctuations of the collective action, and removes the phase transition
observed in models with homogeneous comfort level. Our analysis is based on
dynamical methods of disordered systems theory, in particular on a generating
functional approach, and confirmed by numerical experiments. We also report on
simulations of a system in which the comfort levels fluctuate in time, and point
out crucial differences between models in which the comfort levels of the agents
fluctuate collectively and individually respectively. Finally we comment on a possible
characterisation of El-Farol and Minority Games according to the presence or absence
of ergodicity-breaking phase transitions at infinite integrated response.
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1. Introduction
Complex adaptive systems of inductive agents often display a remarkably rich
global behaviour, which cannot be explained straightforwardly from their microscopic
interactions. The tools of statistical mechanics have here been seen to be able to
provide further insight, and allow for theoretical progress for a variety of agent-based
models. Most notably, analytical solutions for the Minority Game (MG), a mathematical
abstraction of the El-Farol bar problem, have been obtained using equilibrium and non-
equilibrium techniques of disordered systems theory [1, 2, 3].
In the El-Farol bar problem [4], N = 100 customers have to decide independently
whether or not to attend a concert in the bar, the latter having a capacity of λ = 60
seats. Agents will in general not enjoy the bar if it is too crowded, i.e. if more than
λ agents attend. Thus depending on the attendance A, agents who go to the bar are
considered winners if A < λ, and conversely, agents who decide to stay home win if
A > λ. We will refer to λ as the comfort level in the following. Players in the El-Farol
bar problem are inductive agents: they use individual ‘predictors’, based on the past
attendance, to predict whether or not the bar will be crowded at the next time step,
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and according to these predictions they then decide whether to attend or not. They
learn by experience and employ the most accurate predictor which they can access.
Under fairly weak assumptions it can be shown that the temporal average of the
attendance, 〈A〉, converges to the comfort level λ in Arthur’s El-Farol model provided
the predictors are not systematically biased [4]. A second question relates to the degree
to which agents are able to reduce the fluctuations of A about λ, i.e. to the quantity
σ2 = 〈A2〉 − 〈A〉2, where the brackets denote an average over time. We will refer to σ2
as the volatility in the following.
The MG in its original form [5] is a mathematical formulation of the El-Farol
problem at comfort level λ = N/2. All agents take binary decisions at each time-step,
and players in the minority group win. Predictors, fixed at the beginning of the game
and randomly generated, are here unbiased in the sense that they advise to attend or stay
home with equal statistical weights. Generalisations to λ 6= N/2 and/or systematically
biased strategies are possible, and have been studied by numerical simulations in [6, 7].
More systematic studies of El-Farol games with general uniform comfort levels have
been presented [8], see also [9].
In this paper we consider an El-Farol type problem with heterogeneous comfort
levels, so that each agent i prefers to attend the bar only if A < λi, where λi varies
across the population of agents. Our work is an extension of [8], and we reproduce
some results reported there as a special case. We here employ a dynamical approach
whereas the analysis of [8] is based on static replica calculations. Both approaches are
now standard in the context of MGs and related models [1, 2].
The purpose of this study is here twofold. Firstly we aim at understanding the role
of heterogeneous comfort levels for the learning dynamics of the agents. In particular
we will be concerned with the question of whether or not heterogeneity in the comfort
levels compromises the ability of the population of agents to converge to a ‘mean’ comfort
level. Similarly we will study the influence of heterogeneity in the comfort levels on the
temporal fluctuations of the attendance. The second reason for studying the present
system rests in more theoretical issues related to the phase behaviour of MGs and related
models. In the standard MG a phase transition between an ergodic and a non-ergodic
regime has been found, and identified with a point in parameter space in which the
integral over the response function of the system becomes singular [2, 3]. In the non-
ergodic regime a continuum of attractors of the learning dynamics appears to be present
and introduces interesting effects such as a marked sensitivity to initial conditions, which
is absent in the ergodic phase.
Some variants of the MG, however, which are typically only slight modifications of
the original game have been seen not to display the above transition. Some variants
exhibit no transition at all, others one that is of a different type than the one described
above. The transition is absent for example in so-called grand-canonical MGs (GCMG)
[10], and similarly such an absence may be suspected for MG models with finite score
memories [11] although no analytical results are available as yet. In MGs with impact
correction [12] and dilution of the agents’ interaction matrix [13] the transition of the
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type as in the original MG is preceded by one which is referred to as ‘memory-onset’
transition [2]. Ergodicity breaking here still occurs, but at finite integrated response.
This type of transition has been associated with replica-symmetry breaking in static
studies. The second purpose of this paper is thus to try to shed some more light on the
circumstances under which MG models display a transition of the type of the original
MG. We here show that MGs with any degree of heterogeneity in the comfort levels
do not display this type of transition, and conclude with some conjectures on how the
structure of the agents’ learning dynamics may determine the presence or otherwise of
such a transition.
2. Definition of the model
We consider a system of N agents, labelled with Roman indices i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. At
each round t of the game each agent i takes a binary decision bi(t) ∈ {−1, 1} in response
to the observation of a common piece of publicly available information, labelled by µ(t).
bi(t) = 1 may here correspond to player i attending the bar at time t, and bi(t) = −1 to
him not attending. While the information encodes the actual history (i.e. the previous
attendances) in the original version of the El-Farol problem and in the original MG,
we will here assume that µ(t) is chosen randomly and independently from a set with
P = αN possible values at any t, i.e. µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , αN}. This has been seen not to
alter the qualitative behaviour of different variants of the MG [1, 2]. α = P/N is here
the main control parameter of the model, and taken not to scale with N . One then
defines the re-scaled total outcome at round t as A(t) = N−1/2
∑
i bi(t), resulting in
−√N ≤ A(t) ≤ √N (in steps of 2/√N). Note that in this notation (bi(t) ∈ {−1, 1} as
opposed to bi(t) ∈ {0, 1} for not-attending/attending the bar) an attendance of N/2 in
the original El-Farol problem corresponds to A = 0, and accordingly the comfort level
in an actual MG (in which the bar is considered crowded if more than precisely half of
the agents attends) would be λ = 0. Agents who prefer a bar filled by less than half
have λi < 0, agents who can enjoy the bar even if it is populated by more than N/2
attendees have λi > 0. In general the attendance in the original El-Farol problem can
be obtained as (
√
NA(t)+N)/2 from the global action A(t), in our conventions. Having
this simple linear transformation in mind, we will refer to A(t) as the attendance at time
t in the following, and, as mentioned above, to λi as the comfort level of player i. Note
that A(t) remains a well-defined finite quantity in the thermodynamic limit N →∞ at
α = P/N finite, with which the statistical mechanics analysis of the model is concerned.
In order to take their decisions on whether or not to attend each agent i holds two
fixed trading strategies (look-up tables) Ri,a = (R
1
i,a, . . . , R
P
i,a) ∈ {−1, 1}P , with a = ±1.
The binary entries Rµi,a are drawn from some distribution (to be specified below) before
the start of the game; these entries (along with the comfort levels λi) represent the
quenched disorder of this problem. If agent i decides to use strategy a in round t of the
game, his action at this stage will be bi(t) = R
µ(t)
i,a . The agents decide which strategy to
use based on points pi,a(t) which they allocate to each of their strategies. These virtual
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scores are based on the player’s potential success had he always played that particular
strategy, and are updated as follows at every time-step:
pi,a(t+ 1) = pi,a(t)−Rµ(t)i,a (A(t)− λi). (1)
Strategies which would have produced a decision to the liking of player i are thus
rewarded, i.e. if A(t) > λi the scores of strategies a with R
µ(t)
i,a < 0 are increased and
vice versa for A(t) < λi. In the MG literature the above type of process (1) with an
explicit dependence on the influx of information patterns µ(t) is generally referred to as
‘on-line dynamics’. At each round t each player i then uses the strategy in his arsenal
with the highest score, i.e. bi(t) = R
µ(t)
i,si(t)
, where si(t) = arg maxa pi,a(t). It remains to
specify the statistics of the {Rµi,a}. We here choose
P (Rµi,a) =
1 + ρi/
√
N
2
δRµ
i,a
,1 +
1− ρi/
√
N
2
δRµ
i,a
,−1, (2)
as the distribution from which the Rµi,a are drawn (with δx,y = 1 if x = y and δx,y = 0
otherwise), so that Rµi,a = ρi/
√
N for all a, µ (· · · here denotes an average over the
quenched disorder). In the limit of large N , which we will eventually consider, the
distribution of the Rµi,a is well-defined for any ρi ∈ R. If ρi > 0 then player i’s
strategies are more likely to advise him to take a positive action (bi = +1) than a
negative one, and vice versa. We will refer to i’s strategies as being consistent with his
comfort level λi if ρi = λi, and as inconsistent otherwise. For an agent with consistent
strategies the probability of him attending the bar upon randomly choosing one of his
strategies (regardless of their scores) corresponds to his comfort level. The scaling of the
comfort levels and strategy biases with N has here been chosen to ensure a well-defined
thermodynamic limit, and corresponds to the choices of [8].
In the following we will consider a population of agents in which all ρi are drawn
independently from a fixed distribution Q(ρ), and the λi from R(λ). The standard MG
is recovered for λi = ρi ≡ 0 ∀i, i.e. Q(ρ) = δ(ρ) and R(λ) = δ(λ). As we will see
in the further analysis, the specific details of the distribution Q(ρ) are unimportant,
and the only feature relevant for the properties of the model is the mean strategy
bias ρ0 =
∫
dρQ(ρ)ρ. We will also demonstrate that the model is invariant against
simultaneous uniform shifts of the ρi and λi, i.e. under λi → λi + ∆ and ρi → ρi + ∆
for any ∆ ∈ R. Without loss of generality we will therefore mostly restrict to cases with
ρ0 = 0 in the following.
Finally the key observables we will study in this model are given by the deviation
of the mean attendance from the mean comfort level λ0 =
∫
dλR(λ)λ, i.e. by | 〈A〉−λ0|,
and by the fluctuations of the attendance about its mean, i.e. by σ2 = 〈A2〉 − 〈A〉2.
〈· · ·〉 here stands for an average over time in potential stationary states of the system,
i.e. after some sufficiently long equilibration time. To conclude this section we note that
that the model of [8] can be recovered upon assuming homogeneous comfort levels and
strategy biases, i.e. by setting ρi ≡ ρ0 and λi ≡ λ0 for all i.
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3. Statistical mechanics analysis
We will here pursue a dynamical approach based on a generating functional analysis
of the score update rules. We here consider the so-called batch process of the learning
dynamics, which for the present case reads
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t)− 2√
N
∑
µ
ξµi
[
1√
N
∑
j
{
ξµj sj(t) + ω
µ
j
}− λi
]
+ hλi(t),(3)
similar to that of the standard MG [14, 2]. We have here introduced the score
differences qi(t) =
1
2
(pi,1(t)− pi,−1(t)) and the quantities ξµi = 12
(
Rµi,1 −Rµi,−1
)
and
ωµi =
1
2
(
Rµi,1 +R
µ
i,−1
)
, using conventions which are now standard in the MG-literature.
sj(t) ∈ {−1,+1} indicates the strategy player j is using at time t and is given by
sj(t) = sgn[qj(t)], so that player j’s action at time t reads ω
µ
j +ξ
µ
j sj(t) on the occurrence
of information pattern µ. hλi(t) is an external perturbation field, which is set to zero in
all simulations and mostly a mathematical device added to generate response functions.
Perturbations are assumed to be identical for agents with identical comfort level, hence
the subscript λi. Note also that compared to the on-line process an effective average
over all information patterns µ has been performed at each time-step and that time has
been re-scaled.
The above batch process is the starting point for the dynamical analysis of the
problem based on generating functionals. This technique is now standard in the context
of the MG and we will only report the final outcome of the theory here, with some
additional information in the appendix. For the further mathematical details of the
computation in similar cases we refer to the recent textbook [2].
The generating functional analysis turns the Markovian problem of interacting
agents into a self-consistent description in terms of decoupled effective agents subject to
non-Markovian stochastic processes, and is exact in the thermodynamic limit N → ∞
(at fixed α = P/N). For an effective agent with strategy bias λ this process reads
qλ(t + 1) = qλ(t)− α
∑
t′≤t
(1I +G)−1tt′ sλ(t
′) +
√
αηλ(t) + hλ(t), (4)
where the second term on the right-hand side marks a retarded interaction in time
and renders the process non-Markovian. sλ(t) is given by sλ(t) = sgn[qλ(t)] and ηλ(t)
represents the stochasticity of this process. More precisely, ηλ(t) is Gaussian noise of
zero mean, and with temporal correlations
〈ηλ(t)ηλ(t′)〉⋆ = [(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1]tt′ + 2ftft′ − 2λ(ft + ft′) + 2λ2Ett′ . (5)
Here 1Itt′ = δtt′ is the identity matrix and Ett′ = 1 ∀t, t′, and 〈· · ·〉⋆ refers to an average
over realisations of the effective process (i.e. over realisations of the ηλ). C and G are
the correlation and response functions of the system respectively
Ctt′ = lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
〈〈si(t)si(t′)〉〉, Gtt′ = lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
∂〈〈si(t)〉〉
∂hλi(t
′)
(6)
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with 〈〈· · ·〉〉 an average over potentially random initial conditions from which the
dynamics is started. The matrix D finally is given by Dtt′ = 1 + Ctt′ for all t, t
′ and we
have
ft =
∑
t′
[(1I +G)−1(ρ01I +G
′)]tt′ (7)
with
G′tt′ = lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
λi
∂〈〈si(t)〉〉
∂hλi(t
′)
. (8)
These order parameters are then to be determined as averages over realisations of the
effective processes and over the distribution of λ
Ctt′ =
∫
dλR(λ) 〈sλ(t)sλ(t′)|λ〉⋆ (9)
Gtt′ =
∫
dλR(λ)
∂
∂hλ(t′)
〈sλ(t)|λ〉⋆ (10)
G′tt′ =
∫
dλR(λ)λ
∂
∂hλ(t′)
〈sλ(t)|λ〉⋆ (11)
(where 〈· · · |λ〉⋆ is an average over realisations of the effective process restricted to
representative agents with comfort level λ). The further analysis then assumes the
existence of an ergodic stationary state (in which correlation and response functions
depend only on time-differences, i.e. Ctt′ = C(t − t′) and similarly for G and G′
and in which the integrated responses remain finite) and proceeds along the lines of
[14]. We will not report these further steps here, but only quote some of the resulting
equations describing the persistent order parameters in the appendix. These time-
independent order parameters are in the present problem given by the persistent part
c = limT→∞ T
−1
∑
τ≤T C(τ) of the correlation function and by the integrated responses
χ =
∑
τ G(τ) and χ
′ =
∑
τ G
′(τ).
The two observables which we will focus on, namely the mean attendance and the
fluctuations of the attendance, can be computed from the effective particle problem as
follows. Similarly to [14] one finds that
〈〈At〉〉 = ft, 〈〈AtAt′〉〉 = 1
2
[(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1]tt′ + ftft′ (12)
resulting in‡
〈〈A(t)2〉〉 − 〈〈A(t)〉〉2 = 1
2
[(1I +G)−1D(1I +GT )−1]tt. (13)
Temporal averages can then be expressed in terms of persistent order parameters, and
we have
〈A〉 = ρ0 + χ
′
1 + χ
, σ2 =
1
2
[
1 + c
1 + χ
+ 1− c
]
(14)
The former relation is exact, the second obtained within a common approximation
following the lines of [2].
‡ Note here also that 〈ηλ(t)ηλ(t′)〉⋆ = 2〈〈(At − λ)(At′ − λ)〉〉, reflecting the term A(t)−λi in the update
rules of the score difference of player i.
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4. Results
One observes from the above effective agent problem that the distribution of strategy
biases Q(ρ) enters only through its first moment ρ0 as claimed above. Furthermore it
is straightforward to check on the level of the effective process that simultaneous shifts
of the distributions of ρ and λ (i.e. ρi → ρi + ∆ ∀i at the same time as λi → λi + ∆
with some i-independent ∆ ∈ R) do not effect the transients or stationary states of the
model, and it becomes clear that strategy biases and comfort levels are fully equivalent
in the homogeneous case as already found in [8]. This is also verified in simulations.
Thus we can concentrate on the case ρ0 = 0.
4.1. Heterogeneous comfort levels at consistent strategies
We here impose consistency of the strategy biases with the individual comfort levels, i.e.
that ρi = λi for all i. If the λi are then homogeneous over the population of agents, i.e.
if λi = ρi ≡ ρ0 for all i, then the problem can be seen to be equivalent to the standard
MG with random external information [8]. Due to the invariance under uniform shifts
in the ρi and λi this equivalence of the model with homogeneous consistent strategies
to the MG holds irrespectively of ρ0.
We now turn to El-Farol games with a heterogeneous distribution of the λi and ρi,
still maintaining consistency λi = ρi. We here choose the simplest possible case, namely
a bi-modal distribution
R(λ) =
1
2
[δ(λ− ε) + δ(λ+ ε)] (15)
to study the effects of heterogeneity in the comfort levels on the behaviour of the model,
with ε > 0 a model parameter measuring the degree of heterogeneity. ε = 0 reproduces
the standard MG.
One first realises that the mean attendance 〈A〉 is given by the mean comfort level
λ0 =
∫
dλR(λ)λ = 0. In the theoretical analysis this is easily seen to be the case as
χ′ = 0 due to symmetry with respect to ε ↔ −ε, and is also confirmed in simulations
(not shown). The magnitude of the fluctuations of the attendance about this level is
shown in Fig. 1, both as a function of α at fixed ε (left) and as a function of ε at
fixed α (right). For ε = 0 one finds the functional dependence of σ2 on α typical of the
well-known MG, with a minimum attained at an intermediate αc ≈ 0.33 and both high-
volatility and low-volatility branches at α < αc depending on initial conditions, as shown
in the left panel of Fig. 1 for comparison, with open circles marking unbiased starts
(qi(0) = 0), and filled circles starts from strongly biased initial conditions (|qi(0)| ≫ 1).
One finds that σ2 diverges as α → 0 for unbiased starts, and that σ2 → 0 for strongly
biases initial conditions [2, 3]. For α > αc the starting point of the dynamics has no
influence on the persistent order parameters in the stationary state. In the theoretical
analysis the phase transition point separating both regimes is identified as the point at
which the integrated response χ diverges, marking the breakdown of the assumptions
regarding ergodicity.
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Figure 1. (Colour on-line) Volatility for the game with consistent strategies (ρi =
λi ∀i) and bi-modal distribution R(λ) = [δ(λ+ ε)+ δ(λ− ε)]/2. Left: σ2 as a function
of α for different ε = 0 (circles), ε = 1 (squares), ε = 0.5 (diamonds) and ε = 0.01
(triangles). Open symbols are from simulations of the corresponding on-line games
started from tabula rasa initial conditions qi(0) = 0 (with N = 300 agents, averages
over 50 samples are taken, simulations run for 50000 on-line steps (or more for small
ε)). Solid lines are from the analytical theory. Filled circles are for the standard
MG (ε = 0) from strongly biased initial conditions. Right: σ2 as a function of ε at
fixed α = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 (circles, squares, triangles respectively). Symbols are simulations
of the on-line process started from tabula rasa initial conditions, lines the analytical
theory in the ergodic phase. Arrows point out that there are discontinuities of σ2 at
ε→ 0 for α < αc but not at α = 0.5 > αc.
The behaviour of the model with heterogeneous (but consistent) comfort levels is
fundamentally different. For ε > 0 all curves σ2 are found to be increasing functions of α,
and the volatility remains low at low values of α (for all values of ε tested here), as shown
in the left panel of Fig. 1. We here depict measurements from simulations (markers)
as well as the predictions of the analytical theory (lines), and find excellent agreement.
No significant dependence on initial conditions is found. The theoretical analysis shows
no sign of a divergence of either χ or χ′ so that we conclude that the ergodicity-broken
phase of the standard MG is absent as soon as any degree of heterogeneity is added to
the comfort levels. We have also performed an analysis along the lines of [15] to check
for a breakdown of weak long-term memory assumptions at finite integrated response,
and could find no such a memory-onset transition. Thus the system is fully ergodic at
all α > 0 for ε > 0.
The marked difference between the models with and without heterogeneity in the
comfort levels is demonstrated in plots of σ2 versus ε at different values of α in the right
panel of Fig. 1. For α > αc one observes a smooth dependence of σ
2 on ε with no
discontinuity at ε → 0. For α < αc however, a characteristic jump occurs at ε → 0 if
simulations from zero initial conditions are considered. For all ε 6= 0 σ2 remains low,
whereas a substantially higher volatility is found at ε = 0. The magnitude of the jump
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|
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Figure 2. Phase diagram of the model with homogeneous resource level and
homogeneous strategy bias (ρi ≡ ρ0 and λi ≡ λ0 for all i) in the (α, |ρ0 − λ0|) plane.
Up to re-scaling the diagram is identical to that found in [8] by static methods.
here depends on the choice of α < αc an increases as α becomes smaller. Note that a
similar behaviour has been found in MGs with impact correction or dilution [1, 2, 13].
Finally, while we have presented results only for bimodal distributions of the
λi we note that the theory presented here straightforwardly applies to more general
distributions R(λ) as well. Simulations of the model with Gaussian R(λ) of different
non-zero widths ε demonstrate that the phase transition is absent also in this case and
that qualitative behaviour of the model is then similar to that of the game with a bi-
modal distribution of the λi. Thus the specific distribution of the comfort levels seems
to be irrelevant as far as the absence of the phase transition is concerned, and the only
relevant factor appears to be the presence or otherwise of any type of heterogeneity.
4.2. Inconsistent strategies
We here consider the case in which λi 6= ρi. The case of uniformly inconsistent strategies
has been studied in [8]. In our notation the results of [8] correspond to choosing ρi ≡ ρ0
and λi ≡ λ0 for all i, where |λ0−ρ0| measures the degree of inconsistency. The resulting
phase diagram is shown in Fig. 2, and corresponds to that derived in [8] by different
methods. The dependence only on the combination |λ0 − ρ0| reflects the equivalence of
strategy biases and comfort levels in the homogeneous case. Without loss of generality,
we will (mostly) consider the case ρ0 = 0. At any λ0 one then finds a phase transition
of the type which is observed in the standard MG, with an ergodic phase at α ≥ αc(λ0),
and non-ergodic behaviour below αc. In the ergodic regime time-translation invariance
is maintained and the integrated response χ remains finite. The phase transition line in
Fig. 2 is marked by χ→∞ (note that in the case of homogeneous strategy biases χ′ is
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a multiple of χ so that a divergence of χ′ is equivalent to one of χ).
It is here interesting to study the convergence of the mean attendance 〈A〉 to the
mean comfort level λ0. As shown in [8], one finds that indeed 〈A〉 = λ0 below αc, but
not above (if λ0 6= 0, for λ0 = 0 one always has 〈A〉 = 0 by symmetry). In other words
at fixed α agents are able to recover the mean comfort level even in the inconsistent
case, provided strategy biases and comfort levels are uniform and the inconsistency
smaller than some critical value λ0c(α). This is illustrated in the left panel of Fig.
3 (lower curves). At the same time the transition between the phases in which the
mean comfort level can be retrieved, and the one where it cannot, coincides with the
ergodicity-breaking transition. At fixed λ0 the system is ergodic for α > αc(λ0), and
non-ergodic for α < αc(λ0), with large volatilities for unbiased starts at low α, and
small volatilities for biased starts below the transition. Measurements of the volatility
for unbiased starts are shown in Fig. 3 (right panel, upper curves).
We now again turn to the effects of heterogeneity on this system. In the present
case of inconsistent strategies one has to distinguish heterogeneities in the comfort levels
λi from those in the strategy biases ρi. As we will see below strategy biases and comfort
levels are no longer equivalent in the heterogeneous case, and it makes a crucial difference
whether heterogeneities are added to one or the other. In order to disentangle the effects
of both we study the following cases:
(i) heterogeneous strategy biases at homogeneous comfort level (ρi = ±0.05 randomly
and λi ≡ 0.5, diamonds in Fig. 3)
(ii) homogeneous strategy biases at heterogeneous comfort levels (ρi ≡ 0 and λi =
0.5± 0.05, circles in Fig. 3)
(iii) strategy biases and comfort levels both heterogeneous (ρi = ±0.05 and λi =
0.5± 0.05 with no correlation between ρi and λi, squares in Fig. 3)
(iv) strategy bias and comfort level both homogeneous (ρi ≡ 0, λi ≡ 0.5, triangles in
Fig. 3)
(iv) is the case of homogeneous comfort levels and strategy biases as discussed above.
One finds that the transition as observed in (iv) is preserved only in case (i) where
comfort levels are homogeneous, but that it is absent in cases (ii) and (iii) where comfort
levels are heterogeneous. We illustrate this by plotting the mean attendance in the
stationary states for all cases in the left panel of Fig. 3. While the mean comfort
level λ0 = 0.5 is successfully retrieved at low α in (i), systematic deviations are present
irrespectively of α in (ii) and (iii). The right panel of the figure demonstrates that the
volatility remains low in cases (ii) and (iii) (heterogeneous comfort levels) at low α for
unbiased starts whereas σ2 diverges as α → 0 for the systems (i) and (iv) where the
comfort level is uniform. Note also the good agreement of the numerical experiments
with the analytical theory in the ergodic regimes, up to small deviations due to finite-
size and equilibration effects. Finally we also report simulations of a system with
homogeneous comfort levels and strategy biases, but shifted by an amount ∆ = −0.5
with respect to (iv), i.e. we choose ρi ≡ ρ0 = −0.5 and λi ≡ λ0 = 0 for all i (stars
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Figure 3. (Colour on-line) Deviation of the mean attendance 〈A〉 from the mean
comfort level λ0 (left), and fluctuations of the attendance (right). Solid lines are from
theory, markers from simulations, unbiased starts, N = 1000 agents, run for 105 steps,
averaged over 10 samples. Triangles refer to a system with uniform strategy bias and
uniform comfort level (ρi ≡ 0, λi ≡ 0.5), stars to the shifted case ρi ≡ −0.5, λi ≡ 0.
Diamonds, circles and squares represent cases (i), (ii) and (iii) as detailed in the main
text. Vertical lines mark the phase transition for the model with uniform comfort level
λi ≡ λ0 = 0.5 as found from the analytical theory.
in Fig. 3). Results are identical to those of (iv), confirming the translation invariance
against simultaneous uniform shifts of the comfort levels and strategy biases.
4.3. Fluctuating comfort levels
Finally, we consider comfort levels which fluctuate in time in this section. Time-
dependent comfort levels present a form of disorder which is not quenched so that
the standard analytical tools are not straightforwardly applicable to this case. All
results presented in this section therefore rely on numerical simulations of the on-
line process (1). Fluctuating comfort levels are here implemented by drawing each
λi = λi(t) from a bimodal distribution at every time step with no correlations in time
(λi(t)λi(t′)− λi(t) λi(t′) = 0). We here distinguish between collectively and individually
fluctuating comfort levels,
collectively fluctuating: λi(t) ≡ λ0 + εζ(t),
individually fluctuating: λi(t) ≡ λ0 + εζi(t).
Here ζ(t) and the ζi(t) are drawn at random at every time step from the set {−1, 1} with
equal probability, with no correlations over time (or between players in the individually
fluctuating case). All strategy tables are generated at the beginning of the game, and
remain fixed thereafter. We limit the discussion to the case of vanishing strategy biases
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Figure 4. (Colour on-line). Game with resource levels fluctuating in time. Left:
strategies consistent on average, right: inconsistent (see text for details). Simulations
are for N = 300 agents in the consistent case and N = 1000 agents for inconsistent
strategy assignments. Solid lines in both panels are for comparison only, and show
the theoretical lines for heterogeneous comfort levels at same spread ε, but fixed in
time. Filled triangles are simulations of the model with time-independent homogeneous
comfort level.
(ρi = 0 for all i) and study models with consistent and with inconsistent strategies.
Consistency here refers to consistency as a time-average, i.e. to λ0 = 〈λi(t)〉 = ρ0 = 0
for the consistent case and to λ0 6= 0 otherwise.
Results are shown in Fig. 4. We will discuss the cases of collectively and individually
fluctuating comfort levels separately in the following, and focus on the volatility of the
attendance.
4.3.1. Collectively fluctuating comfort levels: the corresponding volatilities are
indicated as solid circles and squares in Fig. 4, with the consistent case shown in the
left panel, and the inconsistent case in the right one. We show results for two different
magnitudes ε in each case. For comparison we also display the analytical curves for fixed
comfort levels (at the same degree of inconsistency as the simulations with fluctuating
levels) as triangles in both panels. One thus concludes that a collectively fluctuating
comfort level does not cause any noticeable effect on the resulting volatility of the
system, but that the system instead behaves as if the collective comfort level was fixed
at its time-average.
4.3.2. Individually fluctuating comfort levels: the case of individually fluctuating
comfort levels appears to be crucially different from the game with collectively
modulated comfort level. Results are displayed as open markers in Fig. 4, and one
finds that individually fluctuating comfort levels reduce the volatility significantly at
small and intermediate values of α as compared to the system with homogeneously fixed
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or collectively fluctuating levels. At larger values of α no such effect is found. While
we cannot fully control equilibration in our experiments, due to apparently increased
relaxation times, our simulations seem to suggest that individually fluctuating levels
reduce the volatility below the one observed in a system with fixed heterogeneous
comfort levels of the same spread ε (indicated as lines in Fig. 4 for comparison). In
particular we find that after sufficiently long ε-dependent waiting times, the observed
volatility shows only little sensitivity to the numerical value of ε.
5. Geometrical interpretation of the phase transition
Our findings regarding the absence of the phase transition in El-Farol models with
heterogeneous comfort levels is interesting also from the point of view of statistical
mechanics of the MG. In this final section we will discuss a geometrical interpretation
of the phase transition of the original MG and will make some suggestions of how it
may be possible to approach the problem of characterising MG models according to the
presence or absence of the phase transition marked by a diverging integrated response.
The update rules of most known versions of the MG are of the form qi(t + 1) =
qi(t) + ξ
µ(t)
i A
µ(t)[q(t)] (in the on-line formulation), with some global time-dependent
quantity Aµ(t)[q(t)] which depends on the information pattern µ(t) presented to the
agents at t and on the strategy score differences q(t) = (q1(t), . . . , qN(t)) of all agents.
A geometrical picture behind the transition of the standard MG can here be devised
as follows [16, 17]: due to the above update rule, the N -dimensional vector q(t) will
move in the space spanned by the αN vectors ξµ = (ξµ1 , . . . , ξ
µ
N), µ = 1, . . . , αN . We
will abbreviate this space by VαN ({ξ}) = {
∑αN
µ=1 cµξ
µ|c1, . . . , cαN ∈ R} in the following.
Since a number φN of agents can generally been shown to ‘freeze’ in MGs (where the
fraction of frozen agents φ = φ(α) depends on the details of the model), i.e. to employ
one strategy only and to have |qi(t)| → ∞ in the long-time limit, the effective number
of degrees of freedom is reduced to [1−φ(α)]N , so that q(t) can be thought of as having
[1−φ(α)]N free components and moving in the αN -dimensional vector space VαN ({ξ}).
If α > 1 − φ(α) then any perturbation on q(t) can be washed out by the dynamics.
If however α < 1 − φ(α) this may not be the case (as the dynamics is restricted to
movements in VαN ({ξ})), and initial conditions may become relevant. The point at
which ergodicity breaking occurs (and the integrated response diverges) can thus be
identified as αc = 1 − φ(αc), which is indeed fulfilled at the transition point of the
standard MG, as illustrated in the inset of Fig. 5.
This picture breaks down whenever the update rules are not of a form which moves
the vector q(t) in the space spanned by the {ξµ}, specifically if q(t + 1) − q(t) is
not a linear combination of the {ξµ}, and one might not necessarily expect to see a
transition with diverging integrated response in this case. Several examples can be
listed here. In grand-canonical MGs [10] one has update rules of the (schematic) form
qi(t+1)−qi(t) = −ξµ(t)i Aµ(t)−κ, with a model parameter κ, and the transition is absent
as soon as κ 6= 0. MGs with finite score memory [11] have update rules of the form
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Figure 5. (Colour on-line) Fraction of frozen agents φ as a function of α. Main panel:
model with consistent strategies, and heterogeneous fixed comfort levels (ρi ≡ 0 ∀i
and λi = ±ε randomly with ε = 1, 0.5, 0.2, 0.01 from top to bottom. Symbols are from
simulations of the batch process (N = 300 agents, averages over 10 samples, run for
a minimum of 1000 batch steps, and longer if required for equilibration). Solid lines
are predictions of the analytical theory. Inset: standard MG (ε = 0), open symbols
represent simulations with tabula rasa initial conditions, full symbols biased starts.
Vertical line in the inset marks αc where αc = 1− φ(αc).
qi(t+1)−qi(t) = −γqi(t)−ξµ(t)i Aµ(t) (with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 defining the inverse time-scale over
which scores are forgotten), and again the transition seems absent as soon as γ > 0. No
analytical results are available for games with finite score memory though. Finally the
transition marked by a diverging integrated response is also absent in MGs with impact
correction and with dilution, but instead preceded by a memory-onset transition (at
which χ remains finite). In both cases one has qi(t + 1) − qi(t) = −ξµ(t)i Aµ(t)i where
A
µ(t)
i carries an explicit dependence on i, hence invalidating the above picture of q(t)
moving in VαN ({ξ}). Specifically Aµi = Aµ(t)−(ν/
√
N)ξµi si(t) in the model with impact
correction (with ν measuring the ability of the agents to correct for their own impact),
and Aµi (t) = N
−1/2
∑
j(cij/c){ωµj +ξµj sj(t)} in the model with dilution (where cij ∈ {0, 1}
and P (cij = 1) = c).
In the model studied in this paper model one has Aµi = A
µ−λi with λi the comfort
level of player i. Thus the quantity Ai does not depend on i if λi ≡ λ0 and the above
geometric interpretation holds and one is not surprised to find the typical MG-transition.
For heterogeneous {λi} this is no longer the case, the picture of the vector q(t) moving
in VαN({ξ}) breaks down and the transition is absent.
Having the listed examples in mind, one may thus speculate whether the property of
the update rules of the standard MG of restricting the increments of q(t) to VαN ({ξ}) is
a necessary condition for a phase transition with diverging integrated response to occur.
Note that such a dynamics would probably not be a sufficient condition for this type of
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transition to be present as additionally the condition α = 1− φ(α) has to be met at αc.
Interestingly we find that in our model with heterogeneous comfort levels this condition
is never fulfilled, as φ(α) > 1 − α for all tested values of α (see Fig. 5). Only as the
degree of heterogeneity ε approaches zero we do find that φ(α) → 1 − α for α < αc
(where αc is the transition point of the MG with uniform comfort level, ε = 0). Similar
observations can be made for the GCMG. In order to test our hypothesis further, one
may want to look for a model in which the dynamics is not restricted to VαN ({ξ}),
but in which there is an α so that 1 − φ(α) = α. The MG with finite score memory
might here be a candidate as no frozen agents are present at any α after long-enough
equilibration [11]. Unfortunately no analytical information on its phase behaviour is
available at present.
6. Concluding remarks
We have investigated a mathematical formulation of the El-Farol bar problem focusing
on the effects of heterogeneity in the comfort levels and/or the biases of the agents’
strategies. Generalizing earlier results of [8] our main finding consists in the observation
that heterogeneity in the comfort levels even of infinitesimal degree removes the phase
transition of the standard MG, while no such removal is observed for heterogeneous
strategy biases. This transition has also been shown to be present in an El-Farol bar
problem with homogeneous comfort level. There one finds a phase at low but non-zero
inconsistency of the strategies, in which the mean attendance converges to the comfort
level, and a second phase in which the comfort level cannot be retrieved due to too large
an inconsistency in the strategy vectors. In the phase of successful retrieval fluctuations
of the attendance around the comfort level are large (for tabula rasa starts), but depend
on initial conditions. In the model with heterogeneous (i.e. agent-dependent) comfort
levels the attendance converges to the mean comfort level if and only if strategies are
fully consistent. This property is lost in the presence of heterogeneous comfort levels for
any degree of inconsistency at any finite α. At the same time models with heterogeneous
comfort levels appear to show low fluctuations of the attendance, and the typical high-
volatility branches of the model with homogeneous levels are absent. Most interestingly
heterogeneous strategy biases at uniform comfort levels do not have the same effect, the
transition is preserved. Hence we can strictly trace removal of the transition back to the
spread in comfort levels, and find that the equivalence of comfort levels and strategy
biases of the homogeneous case does not carry over to the heterogeneous one.
We have also studied El-Farol games with temporally fluctuating comfort levels
and find that the behaviour of the volatility remains unchanged if the level fluctuates
collectively for all players. Individually fluctuating levels, however, can reduce the
volatility significantly.
Finally we have pointed out the similarities of the present model with other MG-
type systems with and without phase transitions, and have discussed a geometrical
interpretation of the updated rules, which may allow to characterise MG-models
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according to the presence or otherwise of the ergodicity breaking transition marked by
a singular integrated response. We hope that these suggestions may stimulate further
investigation of such models with a focus on their classification according to the types
of their respective phase transitions.
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Appendix: Equations describing the ergodic stationary states
Assuming time-translation invariance (i.e. Ctt′ = C(t − t′) and similarly for Gtt and
G′tt′) and finite integrated response one follows the standard ansatz to proceed from the
effective agent problem to explicit equations characterising the relevant persistent order
parameters of the ergodic stationary states. In our problem these are given by c, the
persistent part of the correlation function, and by χ =
∑
τ G(τ) and χ
′ =
∑
τ G
′(τ).
Further details on this analysis relying on a separation of so-called fickle and so-called
frozen agents can be found in [2].
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The resulting 3× 3 system of non-linear equations for {c, χ, χ′} then reads
c =
∫
dλ R(λ)c˜(λ), χ =
∫
dλ R(λ) χ˜(λ), χ′ =
∫
dλ R(λ)λ χ˜(λ) (16)
with R(λ) the distribution from which the strategy biases λi are drawn and where χ˜(λ)
and c˜(λ) given by
χ˜(λ) =
(1 + χ)
α
erf
( √
α√
2g(λ)(1 + χ)
)
, (17)
c˜(λ) = 1− erf
( √
α√
2g(λ)(1 + χ)
)
+
[
(1 + χ)2g(λ)
α
]
×
{
erf
( √
α√
2g(λ)(1 + χ)
)
−
√
2α
pig(λ)(1 + χ)2
exp
(
− α
2g(λ)(1 + χ)2
)}
, (18)
and where g(λ) is the persistent part of the temporal correlations of the noise ηλ(t) in
the effective agent problem which reads
g(λ) =
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
+ 2
(ρ0 + χ
′)2
(1 + χ)2
− 4λρ0 + χ
′
1 + χ
+ 2λ2 . (19)
Following [2] the fluctuations of the attendance can be approximated as〈
A2
〉− 〈A〉2 = 1
2
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
+
1
2
(1− c), (20)
and the mean attendance level turns out to be
〈A〉 = ρ0 + χ
′
1 + χ
. (21)
